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Rethinking likeness and comparability in equality claims brought before the 







Treating like cases alike is not necessarily as restrictive a formula as is often understood to be; 
neither does the comparator requirement have to be one of the problematic aspects of applying 
that formula. Much depends on how we choose to interpret the notion of likeness. This paper aims 
to propose an interpretation that is based not on the similarity of the situations, but on the similarity 
of the claims at hand. It does so with reference to the relevant case-law of the European Court of 
Human Rights. The basic goal is to demonstrate that such an alternative understanding of what 
likeness entails can prove particularly helpful both in terms of comprehending previous instances of 





A is a woman who is getting paid less than B, a male, equally qualified colleague performing exactly 
the same job. When she complains about the unequal treatment, she is reminded by her employer, 
C, that equality means ‘treating like cases alike’. According to C, given that A is a woman and B is a 
man, the two of them are not ‘alike’; hence, no obligation to guarantee equal pay arises. To this 
outrageous argument, A replies that she is equal in dignity to B and she demands to be treated with 
equal respect. She also maintains that there is absolutely no reasonable justification for her being 
treated unfavourably, compared to B, given that she has the same duties and responsibilities as B. 
Moreover, she argues that her sex has nothing to do with her performance or the value attached to 
it; it is an irrational and irrelevant consideration. C agrees but insists that A is not similar to B as 
regards sex, so this is the end of the argument. This imaginary exchange takes place in a dystopia 
where the mere likeness or the unlikeness of one person to another is deemed sufficient to block a 
discrimination claim. Now let us move the discussion to a real courtroom. 
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This time we will be dealing with the (real) claim of Mr Van der Mussele, a Belgian lawyer, who was 
appointed, pursuant to the letter of law, to provide his legal services for free to a person who was 
facing criminal charges but did not have sufficient means to pay for a lawyer1. He brought a claim 
before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), claiming that he had been forced to represent 
that client without being entitled to any remuneration or even reimbursement of his expenses. 
More specifically, he argued, inter alia, that he had been discriminated against in the enjoyment of 
his right not to perform forced or compulsory labour2. This was so because people practicing other 
professions were never obliged to provide their services for free to indigent clients. For example, 
judges, registrars, interpreters or bailiffs would receive some reimbursement when they would be 
involved in legal aid cases. Moreover, other professionals, such as medical practitioners, pharmacists 
or dentists were not required by the State to provide their services for free to people who could not 
afford to pay for them. 
To this argument, the ECtHR replied that ‘between the Bar and the various professions cited by the 
applicant, including even the judicial and parajudicial professions, there exist fundamental 
differences […], namely differences as to legal status, conditions for entry to the profession, the 
nature of the functions involved, the manner of exercise of those functions, etc. The evidence before 
the Court does not disclose any similarity between the disparate situations in question: each one is 
characterised by a corpus of rights and obligations of which it would be artificial to isolate one 
specific aspect’3. The Court deemed this reasoning sufficient to support the conclusion that there 
had been no violation of Article 14 ECHR taken together with Article 4 ECHR in the case before it4. 
This finding is certainly not out of line with the traditional approach adopted by the Court when it 
comes to adjudicating on discrimination claims under Article 14 ECHR. It is a well-known aspect of 
the European Court’s methodology that it will proceed to examine whether or not the difference in 
treatment is objectively and reasonably justified only after it has been shown that ‘the situation of 
the alleged victim can be considered [‘relevantly’] similar to that of persons who have been better 
treated’5. Failure to find such an appropriate comparator might prove fatal to the discrimination 
claim, as happened in the case of Mr Van Der Mussele.    
Such an attitude is not hard to reconcile with the theory of equality. The need for an appropriate 
comparator might fairly be seen as one of the most distinctive –albeit not unproblematic- attributes 
                                                          
1 See Van der Mussele v Belgium, Application no. 8919/80, Judgement of 23 November 1983. 
2 Ibid., para. 45. 
3 Ibid., para 46. 
4 Ibid.  
5 See Fredin v Sweden, Application no. 12033/86, Judgment of 18 February 1991, para. 60. 
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of what we consider to be a formal conception of equality6. Indeed, the famous formula of treating 
like cases alike seems to imply quite clearly that a discrimination claim cannot succeed unless we 
manage to find at least one similarly situated (‘like’) individual who is treated more favourably than 
the claimant. On the face of it, this requirement seems to be perfectly reasonable. Nevertheless, 
cases such as the one of Mr Van Der Mussele seem to be imbued with some kind of unfairness. In 
essence, the Belgian lawyer was denied a proper examination of his claim because his profession 
was of a different nature to the one of dentists or even judges who did not have to work for free. In 
other words, the very ground of discrimination, i.e. the difference in professional status, was used to 
disprove the discrimination claim on the basis that the applicant and the comparator were 
insufficiently similar for the comparison to hold7. Having in mind that anti-discrimination law is 
designed to protect people who are usually different, and therefore not readily comparable to 
others, it is perhaps ironic that this very difference can be used to block the examination of the claim 
at hand.  
This paper aims to put forward a normative framework for interpreting what ‘likeness’ entails in a 
sensible and practical manner, helping us avoid paradoxes such as the ones illustrated by the case of 
Mr Van Der Mussele; it does so with reference to the case-law of the ECtHR, where the comparator 
requirement has been construed traditionally as requiring the ‘similarity’ or ‘analogy’ in the situation 
of those treated differently. The main argument to be advanced here is that there is absolutely no 
reason to perceive of ‘likeness’ as similarity in the factual situation of groups that are being treated 
differently. Instead, it makes more sense to assess similarity in terms of the weight of the legitimate 
interests that a disadvantaged group has in receiving the favourable treatment at hand, as balanced 
against the legitimate interest possessed by those who have already been treated advantageously; 
the weight of such legitimate interests being relative, of course, to the legitimate aim pursued by the 
State. Such an understanding allows us to satisfy the requirement for ‘likeness’ in a more elaborate 
way, bringing the comparator inquiry closer to the justification inquiry, thereby also enhancing the 
quality of the overall reasoning; at the same time, it allows us to avoid the main trap associated with 
comparisons, namely, the failure to perceive respect for difference as an inherent element of the 
right to equality. 
                                                          
6 For a brief discussion and criticism as to the traditional role of comparators in formal equality claims, see 
Sandra Fredman, Discrimination Law, 2nd edition, OUP, 2011, pp. 10-13; for a more elaborate discussion of the 
use of comparators and the problems associated with it, see Suzanne B. Goldberg, ‘Discrimination by 
Comparison’, Yale Law Journal, Vol. 120, 2011, pp.  728-812. 
7 See Mark W. Janis, Richard S. Kay and Anthony W. Bradley, European Human Rights Law: Text and Materials, 
OUP, 3rd edition 2008, at p. 478.   
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The analysis unfolds in four main steps. The first step argues that the classic formulation of formal 
equality does not really require, as a matter of necessity, the tracking down of an ‘analogously 
situated’ comparator and then it proposes a different normative framework for understanding 
‘likeness’. The second step explains how the proposed framework can help us navigate through the 
(very close) interaction between the comparability and the justification stages without conflating the 
two. The third step deals with the way in which the approach advanced in this paper helps us bring 
the formal conception of equality closer to what is known as substantive equality, simply by enabling 
us to look at the requirement for ‘likeness’ from a different angle. Finally, the fourth step explains 
how the perception of likeness as similarity in the weight of the legitimate interests involved can 
help provide clearer answers when the Court is faced with difficult questions.     
 
II. First step: Acknowledging that treating like cases alike does not necessarily require emphasis on 
comparisons 
Peter Westen has famously attacked the principle of equality as being a tautology8. The argument 
has been advanced that ‘equality is entirely circular in the sense that it tells us to treat like people 
alike; but when we ask who ‘‘like people’’ are, we are told they are ‘‘people who should be treated 
alike’’’9. This is actually the biggest challenge that the comparator requirement poses from a 
normative standpoint. All people are similar in some respects and dissimilar in other ways. To ask a 
priori whether or not two people are in an analogous situation is quite an abstract question, for it 
does not determine the standard in relation to which the two are ‘alike’ or ‘unalike’. But this is far 
from suggesting that the classic formula of treating like cases alike is a tautology which is devoid of 
any meaning. In expounding that famous formula, Aristotle himself accurately observed that ‘this is 
the origin of quarrels and complaints – when either equals have and are awarded unequal shares, or 
unequals equal shares’10. Aristotle also noted that in the same way as the ‘unjust is unequal, just is 
equal’11; and the ‘unjust is what violates the proportion’12. But that proportion does not have to be 
determined with reference to similarity in the factual situation alone; instead, the reasons behind 
                                                          
8 See Peter Westen, ‘The Empty Idea of Equality’, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 95, 1981-2, p. 537-596. 
9 Ibid., p. 547. 
10 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, Translated by David Ross, OUP, 2009, Book V, Vol. III, para. 1131a. Far 
more emphasis, of course, was subsequently put on the first limb of that statement, requiring to treat equals 
(those who are alike) equally (in an alike manner), which led to the maxim of ‘treating like cases alike’ taking 
precedence over the need to ‘treat unalike cases, unalike’. Within the case-law of the ECtHR, that difference in 
emphasis is clearly demonstrated by the mere fact that indirect discrimination was not acknowledged by the 
Court until 2000, in the case of Thlimmenos v Greece (infra). 
11 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics (ibid.). 
12 Ibid., para. 1131b. 
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the treatment might actually play a seminal role in determining whether or not some situations are 
‘equal’ or ‘alike’.  
Let us imagine, for example, that A completes the 100 metres race in 15 seconds, while B completes 
it in 20 seconds. The two are not similarly situated as regards the basic criterion for establishing who 
gets to win. Hence, A gets the prize and the glory of finishing first. A is treated unequally to B, the 
two being ‘unalike’ as regards their ability to run fast. Aristotle does acknowledge the just character 
of this unequal treatment as he accepts that being slow or swift is a legitimate criterion for 
determining who is going to win a gymnastics competition; but not in deciding who is going to get an 
office of state13. It follows that people who are ‘alike’ are, in reality, those who have similarly 
legitimate reasons for asserting their share in a distribution. B is treated differently to A because his 
performance, which is the legitimate factor to be taken into account in determining who gets the 
medal, was poorer than A’s. But this is not the end of the matter. Very often, a particular distribution 
or treatment will not be capable of occurring in a symmetrical manner, even between those who 
have legitimate reasons for demanding an equal share. It is in this context that the ‘proportion’, as 
maintained in rights discourse through the principle of proportionality, comes into play. It does so by 
stipulating that an unequal distribution will not be problematic where it is the result of pursuing a 
legitimate aim in a proportionate manner, i.e. by not disadvantaging those who suffer less 
favourable treatment any more than is absolutely necessary to achieve the aim at hand.  
Formal equality then becomes a formula whereby those who have legitimate reasons to request X, 
must be treated in the same way in relation to X, unless there exists a legitimate aim the 
proportionate pursuit of which requires the exclusion of some people from equal treatment in 
relation to X. Thus understood, it does not appear to require the examination of whether or not A 
and B are ‘comparable’ in the sense that they find themselves in a similar or an analogous situation 
as a matter of fact. Instead, the heart of the matter lies on demonstrating the existence of a 
legitimate interest for requesting equal treatment and the existence, or lack thereof, of a legitimate 
aim in denying it, the question of proportionality being a pivotal one. People who are ‘comparable’ 
under this paradigm are those who have a legitimate interest of equal weight to others, as balanced 
against the legitimate aim of the State, in requesting similar treatment. This likeness as to the weight 
of the legitimate interest does not necessarily mean likeness as regards the overall situation of the 
compared groups. Nor does it mean that the legitimate interest at hand must be ‘similar’; it simply 
means that it must be of equal weight. Such an understanding of comparability focuses on the idea 
of proportion as opposed to similarity. Two people are comparable when, on the face of it, their 
                                                          
13 Aristotle, Politics, Translated by H. Rackham, Harvard University Press, 1959, Book III, Vol. III, para. 1283a. 
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legitimate interest in enjoying a specific treatment carries equal weight when balanced against the 
legitimate aim of the State in drawing a distinction. Thus construed, comparability is a first -and 
sometimes final- stage in the assessment of whether or not a difference in treatment is justified.  
More specifically, when called upon to review the objective justification behind a difference in 
treatment, the Strasbourg Court will look into whether or not that difference pursues a legitimate 
aim and whether or not it does so in a proportionate manner14. The comparator requirement simply 
adds a prior stage to this process, i.e. the need that ‘there must be a difference in the treatment of 
persons in relevantly similar situations’15. This may mean that when two individuals are sufficiently 
different they can be treated differently, without further question, a conclusion that is irrational as 
much as it is shallow. Thus, when two elderly unmarried sisters who cohabited and cared for each 
other complained that they were treated differently than married couples or same-sex civil partners 
in that one of the sisters would have to pay inheritance tax when the other would pass away, the 
Court found that they were not similarly situated to the couples they compared themselves with16. 
One of the main differences was that their relationship was based on consanguinity, something that 
was expressly forbidden in the case of marriage or civil partnership. Other differences concerned the 
lack of a deliberate decision to enter into a formal relationship, and the special status accorded to 
marriage and civil partnerships, as social institutions.  
Tracking factual differences may reasonably constitute a first step in the examination of a 
discrimination claim, but it should not suffice to mean without further question that the treatment 
was unproblematic. A more elaborate test of comparability is needed. Indeed, a closer reading of 
this case may reasonably lead us to conclude that a comparison could not be established because 
the State was entitled to retain the special status –and the attached benefits- of marriage and civil 
partnerships for these institutions alone, distinguishing them from situations of simple cohabitation. 
In this sense, the Court might be seen as having decided that the legitimate interest of the two 
sisters (to enjoy exemption from inheritance tax) was not deemed to be equally weighty to the 
legitimate interest of married couples or civil partners (again, to enjoy exemption from inheritance 
tax) in light of the legitimate aim the State pursued (securing the special status of marriages and civil 
partnerships). This can also be seen as another use of proportionality, in balancing and prioritising 
the legitimate interests at hand, as opposed to reviewing the way the legitimate aim is being 
pursued by the State.  
                                                          
14 See Belgian Linguistic case, (1979-80) 1 E.H.R.R. 252 at 284-285 
15 See Burden v United Kingdom, Application no. 13378/05, Judgment of 29 April 2008, para. 60. 
16 Ibid., paras. 61-66. 
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If the legitimate aim (e.g. recognising the distinct status of relationships that are not based on 
consanguinity) is deemed to impinge by necessity on the legitimate interests of one category (e.g. 
sisters) in a different manner than it does on the legitimate interests of another category (e.g. civil 
partners or married couples), then, there is no reason to go further, as the difference in treatment 
has been justified through comparability. But should the legitimate aim (e.g. providing a social 
service to indigent clients free of charge) be deemed to impinge by necessity on the rights of the two 
categories (e.g. lawyers and dentists) in the same way, then we would need to decide to what extent 
the pursuit of that legitimate aim necessitates the different treatment of people whose legitimate 
interests are similar in terms of their weight; in this stage of justification, the balancing of 
proportionality would concern the different treatment of people who have legitimate interests of 
equal weight and would also be informed by a wider range of factors, not directly dealt with at the 
comparability stage, such as the margin of appreciation and the level of scrutiny to be applied to the 
discrimination ground17.   
An understanding of comparability as denoting simply the factual similarity in the situations of 
groups treated differently, amounts to a failure to recognise this propinquity between comparability 
and justification. Being an ‘equal’ or ‘alike’ should mean having legitimate interests that equally 
outweigh the legitimate aim against which they are balanced; not having a ‘similarly’ or ‘analogously’ 
legitimate interest. For the legitimate interest might be completely different in nature or character 
while its weigh in the balancing exercise remains the same. This is the logical ‘comparative’ element 
of formal equality, one that is based on the equal weight of (specific) legitimate interests, not on the 
similarity of (abstract) situations. The similarity or dissimilarity among different situations is a 
relevant factor to consider only insofar as it affects the strength of the legitimate interests, i.e. the 
balance of proportionality. This observation can be the key to understanding why in reality the 
comparator requirement is often conflated with the justification inquiry, as a matter of practice 
within the case law of the ECtHR. The next section will elaborate further on that phenomenon with a 
view to showing that what appears as a conflation of two separate steps in the methodology of the 
Court –that is, the comparator and the justification stage- is in reality an indirect acknowledgment of 
the theory advanced here.  
 
III. Second step: Merging comparisons with justifications in a normatively sensible way 
The argument has been put forward that, in deciding cases on the basis of lack of comparability 
alone, the Court ‘employ[s] a stealth, ‘‘light touch’’ justification to obviate the need for a more 
                                                          
17 For further discussion, see the next section. 
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demanding justification inquiry in which the State must defend the proportionality of its measure’18. 
The reality of adjudication attests to the accuracy of this statement. Let us focus, for example, in a 
case where the Court held that a person who has been convicted for a terrorist offence is not in a 
relevantly similar situation, as concerns automatic parole, to somebody who has been convicted for 
an ordinary offence19. According to the Court, the former can legitimately be treated less favourably 
than the latter, the distinction being ‘made not between different groups of people, but between 
different types of offence’20. In other words, two people may be treated differently because of 
objective reasons which render them ‘unalike’. In this context, the lack of comparability effectively 
amounts to objective justification in the sense that the distinction was not based on a prohibited 
ground, but on objective considerations21. But the very existence of such considerations is, 
necessarily, a form of justification. In other words, determining whether or not two situations are 
comparable is a process which is hard to distinguish from the justification inquiry, in the first place. 
A question necessarily arises, then, as to what is the distinct test to be applied in determining 
comparability, as opposed to investigating whether or not a reasonable justification exists. The 
standard requiring that the applicants find themselves in an ‘analogous’ or ‘similar’ situation to 
those being treated more favourably seems quite tautological in this respect. Indeed, to say that 
people are comparable when they are in an analogous situation is like saying that people are free 
when they find themselves in a condition of liberty. Given the lack of a more specific standard or test 
with reference to which comparability takes place, it is no surprise that this stage might often by 
absorbed by the more structured stage of justification; this might happen when the question of 
comparability is superficially addressed and practically bypassed in order to proceed with the 
justification inquiry. The case of Sidabras and Džiautas v Lithuania22 provides a very clear example of 
such an instance. The applicants has served as KGB employees during the Soviet period and, by 
reason of that employment history, they were subsequently excluded for a period of ten years from 
undertaking employment in the public sector and in certain posts in the private sector in Lithuania. 
They complained of a violation of Article 8 ECHR taken together with Article 14 ECHR, as regards 
their exclusion from private sector jobs. 
                                                          
18 See Aaron Baker, ‘Comparison Tainted by Justification: Against a "Compendious Question" in Art.14 
Discrimination’, Public Law, 2006, pp. 476-497 at 477. 
19 See Gerger v Turkey, Application no. 24919/94, Judgment of 8 July 1999. 
20 Ibid., para. 69; for a similar approach, see Kafkaris v Cyprus, Application no. 21906/04, Judgment of 12 
February 2008, para. 165. 
21 The usefulness of examining whether or not the situation is analogous as a step in the determination of 
whether or not the treatment is based on a prohibited grounds has been acknowledged time and again: see, 
for example, Aaron Baker, ‘Comparison Tainted by Justification: Against a "Compendious Question" in Art.14 
Discrimination’ (supra) at 477; also see Aileen McColgan, Discrimination, Equality and the Law, Hart Publishing, 
2016, p. 108.   
22 Applications nos. 55480/00 and 59330/00, Judgment of 27 July 2004. 
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The Court did accept the case fell within the ambit of Article 8 ECHR as ‘a far-reaching ban on taking 
up private sector employment [did] affect “private life”’23. It also observed that ‘the applicants were 
treated differently from other persons in Lithuania who had not worked for the KGB, and who as a 
result had no restrictions imposed on them in their choice of professional activities’24. It then 
proceeded right away to the reasonable justification inquiry, accepting that the measure aimed at 
protecting the values of the newly founded Lithuanian State from those who had collaborated with 
the previous regime25; thus, it ‘pursued the legitimate aims of the protection of national security, 
public safety, the economic well-being of the country and the rights and freedoms of others’26. 
Nevertheless, the measure was deemed to be disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, 
mainly because it extended to private sector employment, an area where ‘an employee’s loyalty to 
the State’ was not necessarily a requirement in the same way as it was for employment to the public 
sector27. Hence, there was a violation. As Judge Loucaides noted in his partly dissenting opinion, it 
was hardly evident that former KGB agents were in an analogous situation to those who had not 
worked for the KGB, given that the legitimate aims at hand -that the court recognised- concerned 
specifically the former as opposed to the latter. 
In fact, the case is a good illustration of how the Court’s eagerness to examine a discrimination claim 
might prevail over its adherence to the traditional methodology. Alongside Judge Loucaides’s 
critique of the bypassing of the comparator requirement, Judge Thomassen also raised in her partly 
dissenting opinion a legitimate concern that KGB employment was not clearly a personal 
characteristic to be protected by Article 14 ECHR, as it constituted neither a choice to be respected 
as an element of one’s personality (such as religion), nor an immutable feature (such as race). 
Finally, the very acceptance by the Court that employment claims could come within the ambit of 
the Convention, which does not include a right to work, was paradigm-shifting and did not go 
unnoticed28. The argument may be advanced, therefore, that the stakes were too high for the Court 
to prevent itself from fully examining that claim by reason of the comparator requirement. The exact 
opposite attitude seems to have been maintained in the case of Carson and Others v United 
                                                          
23 Ibid., para. 47. 
24 Ibid., para. 41. 
25 Ibid., para. 54. 
26 Ibid., para. 55. 
27 Ibid., paras. 57-58. 
28 See Virginia Mantouvalou, ‘Work and Private Life: Sidabras and Dziautas v Lithuania’, European Law Review, 
Vol. 30, No. 4, 2005, pp. 573-585; also see Hugh Collins, ‘The Protection of Civil Liberties in the Workplace’, The 
Modern Law Review, Vol. 69, No. 4, 2006, pp. 619-631. 
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Kingdom29, where the ECtHR analysed the comparator issue so exhaustively as to effectively merge it 
with the justification enquiry, in striking down the claim of the applicants.  
The applicants in Carson had spent the greater part of their working life in the United Kingdom but 
had later moved to live in South Africa, Australia and Canada. They complained of the fact that 
pensions in the United Kingdom would be index-linked only for those who either resided within its 
jurisdiction or whose country of residence had a reciprocal agreement with the United Kingdom as 
regards the uprating of pensions. The applicants not falling within either category, alleged that they 
had been discriminated against in the enjoyment of their right to property (Article 1, Protocol No. 1 
ECHR), on the grounds of their residence. The Court accepted that during the course of their 
employment in the United Kingdom, the applicants had paid the same compulsory national 
insurance contributions as the categories of people whose pensions were index-linked. 
Nevertheless, it concluded that they were not in an analogous situation to them. This was so 
because national insurance contributions were not exclusively linked to the State pension, but were 
also used to fund a range of other social security benefits30. Hence, their contributions did not suffice 
in themselves to place the applicants to a similar position to the other pensioners31.  
Moreover, the Court noted that it is in the nature of a social welfare system to be concerned 
primarily with the standard of living of those who were resident within its jurisdiction, also taking 
into account that the increase in their pension would eventually be returned to the domestic 
economy32. Finally, the Court observed that ‘it is hard to draw any genuine comparison with the 
position of pensioners living elsewhere, because of the range of economic and social variables which 
apply from country to country. Thus, the value of the pension may be affected by any one or a 
combination of differences in, for example, rates of inflation, comparative costs of living, interest 
rates, rates of economic growth, exchange rates between the local currency and sterling (in which 
the pension is universally paid), social security arrangements and taxation systems’33. The 
comparison with the residents of those countries that had a reciprocal agreement with the United 
Kingdom to uprate pensions also failed on the grounds that ‘it would be extraordinary if the fact of 
entering into bilateral arrangements in the social security sphere had the consequence of creating 
an obligation to confer the same advantages on all others living in all other countries. Such a 
                                                          
29 Application no. 42184/05, Judgment of 16 March 2010. 
30 Ibid., para. 84. 
31 Ibid., para. 85. 
32 Ibid., paras. 85-86. 
33 Ibid., para. 86. 
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conclusion would effectively undermine the right of States to enter into reciprocal agreements and 
their interest in so doing’34. 
It is not hard to see how this reasoning effectively amounts to a justification of the treatment at 
hand, as opposed to a mere effort to answer the question of whether or not the applicants were 
similarly situated to those who benefited from an uprating in their pension. Insofar as the applicants 
had contributed to the National Insurance System on the same terms as the other pensioners, it is 
hard to resist the conclusion that they had a similarly (if not identical) legitimate interest in asking to 
be treated in the same way. The arguments relied upon by the Court in establishing the lack of 
comparability effectively amount to accepting the proportionality in the pursuit of the legitimate 
aims put forward by the United Kingdom in refusing to do so. Thus, the question of comparator 
actually absorbed the justification inquiry. In contrast to Sidabras, where the comparator 
requirement was sidestepped in order to protect the applicants, in Carson it was overextended in 
order to stall the complaint brought before the Court. But despite this apparent contradiction, the 
fact remains that in both cases the Court effectively never addressed the comparator requirement as 
an issue which pertains only to the similarity of the situations at hand, in a narrow and ambiguous 
sense. And yet, there appears to exist an underlying philosophy which allows us to find meaning in 
that contradiction. 
One may fairly argue that in Sidabras the applicants were not in an ‘analogous’ situation to those 
who had not worked for the KGB, especially if we take into account the socio-historical context of 
the case at hand. Indeed, by conceding that the restriction placed on finding employment in the 
public sector was legitimate, the ECtHR itself seems to have accepted that reality. But in finding that 
an issue arose as regards employment in the private sector, despite the same legitimate aim being 
pursued, the Court implied that the applicants where in an analogous situation to non-KGB agents in 
that respect. Under this light, merging the comparator stage with the justification inquiry can be 
seen in the following way: While the applicants’ legitimate interest in being employed did not carry 
the same weight as those of non-KGB agents as regards the public sector, it was of equal importance 
as regards finding employment in the private sector, when measured against the legitimate aim of 
the State. Such an understanding is illustrated in the finding of the Court that employing people who 
have historically proven their loyalty to the state was important in the public sector but not as 
important in the private sector35.  
                                                          
34 Ibid., para. 89. 
35 See Sidabras, supra, para. 57. 
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Hence, the impact that the pursuit of the legitimate aim would have on the applicants’ legitimate 
interest in finding public sector employment was of a different weight to the one of those had not 
worked for the KGB; the two were not comparable. But the applicants’ legitimate interest in finding 
private sector employment was of equal weight to the one of those who had not worked for the 
KGB, when balanced in the same way against the same legitimate aim. Hence, the two interests 
were comparable. The comparability stage examined the issue of proportionality by reviewing the 
way the legitimate aim impacted on the two legitimate interests at hand, i.e. of those working in the 
public sector and those working in the private sector. It concluded that the legitimate interests of 
the applicants and those working in the private sector were of equal weight and that unlocked the 
justification stage. The justification stage should have examined then whether or not the difference 
in the treatment of people who have legitimate interests of equal weight was proportionate to the 
legitimate aim pursued and, therefore justified, having regard also to a wider range of factors such 
as the scrutiny normally applied to the ground at hand (KGB employment) and the margin of 
appreciation. The finding that the legitimate interests of the applicants and those who were allowed 
to pursue private employment were similar would definitely weigh against the State in that process; 
but it would not be the end of the matter. Whereas the finding of the different weight of the 
legitimate interests as regards public sector employment was enough to end the discrimination 
claim in that respect.   
By the same token, one may fairly argue that in Carson the applicants were actually in a comparable 
situation to those treated more favourably, given that they had paid the same amount of money in 
contributions. But even though they had exactly the same legitimate interest in requesting access to 
the more favourable treatment, the legitimate aim of the State in administering its social security 
system in a rational and efficient manner weighted more heavily against the applicants than against 
those who resided in the United Kingdom or those whose country of residence had a bilateral 
agreement with the United Kingdom. Hence, the applicants were not really in an analogous situation 
to those treated more favourably. In other words, although their legitimate interest in requesting 
the uprate was practically the same in terms of its nature, given that they had contributed in the 
same manner, its relative weight, when balanced against the legitimate aim of the State, was 
different. The fact that the applicants did not have a legitimate interest that was of equal weight to 
the one of those receiving better treatment rendered any justification of that difference in 
treatment unnecessary. Thus, we see that both in Sidabras and in Carson, the comparator 
requirement was neither sidestepped nor overemphasised, as it might appear in the first instance. 
Instead, the issue of likeness, in the more elaborate sense put forward here, formed the crux of both 
cases, the Court examining whether or not the legitimate interest of the applicants in asking a better 
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treatment was actually of equal weight to the legitimate aim of those enjoying that treatment, when 
balanced against the legitimate aim. This is a stage prior to and distinct from justification, but very 
closely connected to it.  
The comparability stage as put forward here asks whether or not the legitimate interests of A and B 
are of equal weight in the first place, proportionality being used to assess the impact of the 
legitimate aim on the legitimate interests of A and B respectively. If it is established, through the 
comparison, that A and B have a claim of equal weight, only then we can proceed to the justification 
stage. The justification stage is concerned with determining whether or not treating people with 
legitimate interests of equal weight differently in pursuing the legitimate aim is proportionate. 
Proportionality is used once again here, but in a different way. Moreover, its application is also being 
informed by aspects not dealt with directly in the comparison stage; most importantly, the level of 
the scrutiny to be applied, depending on the ground the distinction is based upon and the State’s 
margin of appreciation36. The justification stage as envisaged here also differs from the comparison 
stage in the sense that it provides an opportunity to consider reasons of overriding public interest 
which might not be reflected on the legitimate aim. To use the example of Mr Van Der Mussele, 
even if lawyers had an interest of similar weight to the one of (e.g.) judges, the State could have 
claimed that given that more lawyers are needed than judges, as a matter of sheer quantity, it was 
proportionate that a harsher restriction should be placed on the former. Thus construed, the 
comparability stage retains its character as a way to dismiss unmeritorious discrimination claims 
without engaging in the full depths of justification, but it also amounts to a first stage of justification, 
instead of being a mere inquiry into the similarities and dissimilarities of different groups. 
Such an understanding of the comparator helps us escape the abstract notion of ‘similarity in 
situations’ and allows us to make sense of many cases, like the ones examined here, which could 
otherwise be seen as confusing.  Moreover, it helps us avoid the trap of not examining potentially 
meritorious claims, such as the one brought forward by Mr Van Der Mussele, simply by reason of an 
abstractly defined similarity. Besides, respect for difference is a necessary aspect of non-
discrimination law, as the ECtHR itself has come to understand it37. In this sense, approaching the 
comparator requirement in the way suggested here provides yet another significant service. It helps 
                                                          
36 It is established in the jurisprudence of the Court that distinctions based on certain grounds (e.g. sex, race) 
require particularly serious reasons before they can be justified: see, for example, Oddný Mjöll Arnardóttir, 
‘Vulnerability under Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights: Innovation or Business as 
Usual?’, Oslo Law Review, Vol. 4, 2017. It is worth noting that the issue of what constitutes a ground of 
discrimination and what does not is itself another complicated issue in the case law of the Court: see Janneke 
Gerards, ‘The discrimination grounds of Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights’, Human 
Rights Law Review, Vol. 13, Issue 1, 2013, pp. 99-124. 
37 See Charilaos Nikolaidis, The Right to Equality in European Human Rights Law: The Quest for Substance in the 
Jurisprudence of the European Courts, Routledge, 2015, pp. 75-82. 
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us, bridge the gap between the formal and the substantive understanding of the right to equality, by 
enabling the Court to protect those who are ‘unalike’ in the situations they find themselves in but 
‘alike’ in their need to be treated as equals. The next section will address this issue. 
 
IV. Third step: Bridging formal and substantive equality 
The requirement of treating like cases alike has been associated with a formal conception of 
equality, one that is primarily concerned with rationality and freedom from arbitrariness, dictating 
that similarly situated people are to be treated in a similar fashion, unless an objective justification 
exists for a different approach. Hence, for example, the argument has been advanced that ‘[a] strict 
focus on comparability leads to a very formal approach to equality’38. But, as already explained 
above, the advantaged and the disadvantaged group can hardly be considered to be similarly 
situated when there is considerable difference in the weight of their legitimate interest to request 
access to the more favourable treatment. Bringing closer the comparator requirement with the 
justification inquiry in such a way can help us move even further, crossing the line that traditionally 
separates formal and substantive equality, thereby bridging the two conceptions of equality. Indeed, 
the argument has been made that a substantive approach to equality is anything but absent from 
the case law of the Court relating to the interpretation of Article 14 ECHR39. More specifically, it has 
been argued that the interest of protecting the individual against social oppression in the form of 
prejudice, stereotyping and lack of reasonable accommodation of difference has come to imbue the 
traditional methodology which, historically, centred around the formal equality paradigm of securing 
rationality in the enjoyment of the other Convention rights40. But pursuing such an interest is bound 
to require a reconfiguration of the traditional methodology, especially as regards the comparator 
requirement. 
In the seminal case of Thlimmenos v Greece41, the Court famously held that ‘[t]he right not to be 
discriminated against in the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed under the Convention is also 
                                                          
38 See Oddný Mjöll Arnardóttir, Equality and Non-Discrimination under the European Convention on Human 
Rights, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2003, p. 127. 
39 See Charilaos Nikolaidis, The Right to Equality in European Human Rights Law: The Quest for Substance in the 
Jurisprudence of the European Courts (supra), pp. 50-100; for a similar approach, see Sandra Fredman, 
‘Emerging from the Shadows: Substantive Equality and Article 14 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights’, Human Rights Law Review, Volume 16, Issue 2, 2016, pp. 273–301. Also see Alexandra Timmer, 
‘Toward an Anti-Stereotyping Approach for the European Court of Human Rights’, Human Rights Law Review, 
Vol. 11, No. 4, 2011, pp. 707-738 and Rory O’Connell, ‘Cinderella Comes to the Ball: Art 14 and the Right to 
Non-Discrimination in the ECHR’, Legal Studies, Vol. 29, No. 2, June 2009, pp. 211–229.  
40 Charilaos Nikolaidis, The Right to Equality in European Human Rights Law: The Quest for Substance in the 
Jurisprudence of the European Courts (ibid). 
41 Application no. 34369/97, Judgment of 6 April 2000.  
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violated when States without an objective and reasonable justification fail to treat differently 
persons whose situations are significantly different’42. More specifically, it found that the State was 
in breach of its obligations under Article 14 in conjunction with Article 9 because of its failure to 
differentiate between a common felon and a person who had been convicted of a felony because he 
had refused, due to his religious beliefs, to wear a uniform while serving in the army. To that effect, 
the applicant had been indirectly discriminated against because the State’s decision to exclude him 
from the profession of chartered accountants failed to take account of the fact that his conviction 
was closely related to his religious beliefs. It is not hard to see how, in essence, if the comparator 
requirement is to be understood as requiring a ‘similar situation’ between those treated less and 
more favourably, it would nullify cases such as this one; for the very essence of the complaint at 
hand concerns the failure to treat those who are unalike in an unalike manner, that is, to 
accommodate their difference43. 
It is no surprise then that the Court itself felt obliged to say that the prohibition against ‘treat[ing] 
differently persons in analogous situations without providing an objective and reasonable 
justification […] is not the only facet of prohibition of discrimination in Article 14’44; thus, 
distinguishing between the traditional, comparator-driven, approach and the one reflected in the 
concept of indirect discrimination. But the case remains that a difference in treatment is a common 
element in both direct and indirect discrimination; the only distinguishing factor being that in the 
latter case that difference is covert, becoming evident only through its de facto impact on the 
disadvantaged group. Given that the difference in treatment is a common element, as is, of course, 
the ambit requirement, the existence of an appropriate ground for discrimination and the 
justification inquiry, the only part of its methodology that the Court had to discard in reviewing 
indirect discrimination claims is the comparator stage. This appears to highlight even further the 
unnecessariness of comparators within the Court’s methodology. But once again, the absence of a 
distinct comparator inquiry does not imply that there was no ‘likeness’ involved; if we understand 
the term to require a balancing of the legitimate interest of the applicant and of those with other 
religious convictions against the legitimate aim of the State.  
Mr Thlimmenos was treated less favourably than those whose religious convictions did not prevent 
them from wearing a uniform, i.e. those who could move on to be appointed as chartered 
accountants without any problem. He suffered such a treatment because of his religion –a ground 
                                                          
42 Ibid., para. 44. 
43 For a brief discussion of the close relationship between the notions of indirect discrimination and reasonable 
accommodation, see Charilaos Nikolaidis, The Right to Equality in European Human Rights Law: The Quest for 
Substance in the Jurisprudence of the European Courts (supra), pp. 27-28. 
44 Thlimmenos v Greece (supra), para. 44. 
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specifically covered by Article 14 ECHR- and his claim did come within the ambit of the right to 
freedom of thought conscience and religion (Article 9 ECHR). Finally, although Mr Thlimmenos was 
certainly not in an ‘analogous’ or ‘similar’ position to those who had different religious convictions 
and had not been convicted of an offence, his legitimate interest in becoming a chartered 
accountant despite of his religious beliefs outweighed the legitimate aim of the State which 
purported to disallow people convicted of serious offences from doing so. By defeating that 
legitimate aim, Mr Thlimmenos was effectively put in the same position as the people against whom 
this legitimate aim did not apply in the first place, i.e. those who could enter the profession freely. In 
that wider interpretation of what a comparison entails, he was in reality ‘alike’ to those people 
whose situation was anything but similar.  
Such a wider understanding of comparability allows us to build a more coherent framework for the 
application of the principle of non-discrimination, one that contains all its different manifestations 
and is not limited to direct discrimination. When the legitimate interest of a group in not being 
treated with reference to a prohibited ground is deemed sufficient to outweigh the legitimate aim of 
the State, then, any de jure or de facto difference in treatment is problematic. This is so because, in 
that case, the legitimate interest of the disadvantaged group is of equal weight to that of the 
advantaged group whose legitimate interest is properly acknowledged by the action or the inaction 
of the State. Thus, the two groups are ‘alike’ and must be placed in an equal position. So, when, for 
example, the Court observed that Roma children were far more likely than non-Roma children to be 
placed into special schools in the Czech Republic, it found a violation of Article 14 ECHR taken 
together with Article 2, Protocol No. 1 (Right to education)45. The legitimate aim of the State to 
provide for those with special educational needs was outweighed by the legitimate interest of Roma 
children not to be allocated to special schools with reference to their ethnicity. Assessing the 
educational needs of all the children though the same psychological tests, which did not take Roma 
specifics into account, led to such covert differential treatment46. 
The negation of the State’s legitimate aim in the face of the applicants’ legitimate interest meant 
that the applicants had a legitimate interest of equal weight to the one of non-Roma children and 
should be placed in the same place as them in terms of their chance to end up in a special school, 
even when that would require a corrective difference in treatment, in terms of adapting the 
psychological tests. Adaptation in this context means that the policy should affect those who had a 
legitimate interest of equal weight in the same manner. So, to use a more recent example, when a 
                                                          
45 See D.H. and Others v Czech Republic, Application no. 57325/00, Judgment of 13 November 2007, paras. 
207-210. 
46 Ibid., paras. 200-201. 
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student who had successfully passed the entrance exam was denied access to the Turkish National 
Music Academy on the sole ground that she was blind and, therefore, unfit to follow the classes, the 
Court found that the lack of reasonable accommodation led to a violation of Article 14 ECHR taken 
together with Article 2, Protocol No. 1 ECHR47. The ECtHR noted specifically that the applicant had 
passed the entrance exams thereby demonstrating that ‘she possessed all the requisite qualities’ for 
studying there48. In other words, her legitimate interest in being admitted, outweighed the 
legitimate aim of the academy to select ‘students with special talents’49 in the same way as the 
legitimate interest of those admitted did. Despite not being similarly situated to them as regards a 
particular personal characteristic, she had a legitimate interest of equal weight in being admitted, 
and in that sense, she was comparable.  
Once more then, it becomes evident that comparability does not have to be seen as something 
exterior to substantive equality, just as there is no reason to be perceived as problematic in formal 
equality cases. In fact, the more we move away from a formal equality model which requires to give 
us the same treatment to those who are ‘alike’, the more we see the comparator requirement fade 
away, as cases like Thlimmenos demonstrate. But, as suggested thus far, this is only if we understand 
the comparator to entail a similarity in situation as opposed to an equal or similar weigh in the 
legitimate interests at hand when measured against the legitimate aim. This latter approach of equal 
weight in the legitimate interests can help the Court move even beyond cases of direct or indirect 
discrimination, without having to reconfigure its methodology and the role of comparators every 
step along the way. A very good illustration of this assertion can be found in the example of cases 
involving discrimination by association. That is, instances where people are being discriminated 
against by reason of their association to persons bearing a specific personal characteristic. 
The case of Guberina v Croatia50 concerned the claim of a father who owned a flat on the third floor 
of a building without an elevator. His new-born child was suffering from various forms of mental and 
physical disability and the lack of an elevator meant that there was a serious issue of accessibility for 
the child. As a result, he had to move to a different place. In doing so, he asked to be exempted from 
the real property transfer tax on the grounds that the move was necessary to meet his housing 
needs, a criterion for exemption that was specifically provided for by the national law. The tax 
authorities refused his request on the ground that the earlier flat did meet the applicant’s housing 
needs in terms of surface, hygiene, technical requirements and access to basic infrastructure such as 
water, electricity and other public utilities. The Strasbourg Court found that the specific condition 
                                                          
47 See Çam v Turkey, Application no. 51500/08, Judgment of 23 February 2016, paras. 68-69. 
48 Ibid., para. 62. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Application no. 23682/13, Judgment of 22 March 2016. 
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the applicant found himself in was not properly taken into account in determining what the basic 
infrastructure requirements were in his case51. More specifically, the Court noted that ‘the 
applicant’s flat […], which he had bought three years before the birth of his son, situated on the third 
floor of a residential building without a lift, severely impaired his son’s mobility and consequently 
threatened his personal development and ability to reach his maximum potential, making it 
extremely difficult for him to fully participate in the community and the educational, cultural and 
social activities available for children’52. Eventually, a violation of Article 14 ECHR taken together 
with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 ECHR (Right to property) was established. 
The Court tackled the issue of comparability by observing that the situation of the applicant’s son 
‘might be compared to that of an able-bodied person who, for example, had a flat on the third floor 
of a residential building without appropriate access to it, or had limited access to the necessary 
relevant public amenities’53. It also noted that the applicant himself ‘was in a comparable position to 
any other person replacing a flat or a house’ to meet his housing needs, but, that ‘his situation 
nevertheless differed with regard to the meaning of the term “basic infrastructure requirements” 
which, in view of his son’s disability and the relevant national and international standards on the 
matter […], necessitated access to facilities such as, in the instant case, a lift’54. The Court, therefore, 
seems to have suggested that the son was in a similar situation to a person who did not have a 
disability and the father was taken to be analogously situated to a person whose housing needs did 
not require the reasonable accommodation that was necessary here, i.e. the existence of a lift. 
While a finding of similarity in the situations at hand in this case might be highly questionable, given 
the objective dissimilarities that the Court itself acknowledged, the case remains that the applicant 
had, on the face of it, a legitimate interest of equal weight to the legitimate interest of a father of an 
able-bodied child in meeting his housing needs, whatever this might have entailed. 
Letting go of the insistence on similarity can help us deal with cases of discrimination of association 
and reasonable accommodation, like Guberina, in a more simplified and rational way, without the 
need to compare separately (and often paradoxically) the person bearing the characteristic and the 
person associated with him or her among different comparators. By the same token, it can help us 
deal with cases of intersectional discrimination, where the unfavourable treatment, be it overt or 
                                                          
51 Ibid., para. 86. 
52 Ibid., para. 82. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid., para. 83. 
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covert, might stem from a combination of characteristics55. For example, the nature of the 
unfavourable treatment faced by an old (age) woman (sex) belonging to an ethnic minority (race) 
might not be easily understood with reference to a comparison based on a younger woman, a 
younger man, or a man or a woman of different ethnic minority. By focusing on the weight of the 
legitimate interest of the applicant and of those treated more favourably as balanced against the 
legitimate aim pursued, the issue could be addressed without having to worry about establishing 
similarity. This would be an important step in understanding better the interconnection in the 
different manifestations of equality. But it would not be the end. Yet another important contribution 
of understanding comparability as being focused on the equal weight of the legitimate interest at 
hand, as opposed to the similarity in the situation of those treated more favourably, stretches even 
beyond the notions of formal and substantive equality. It concerns the quality of decision-making 
and the sheer clarity with which the Court articulates its decisions. The next section will address just 
that. 
 
V. Fourth step: Addressing hard questions for what they are 
The case of Ratzenböck and Seydl v Austria56 concerned the application of a different-sex couple who 
complained of the fact that only same-sex couples could enter into a registered partnership in 
Austria. The applicants alleged that in not being allowed to register as partners, they had been 
discriminated against on the grounds of their sex and sexual orientation. Quite evidently, what 
distinguishes this case from previous instances brought before the ECtHR is the fact that the 
applicants belonged to what could fairly be described as the ‘advantaged’ group. This is so because 
different-sex couples in Austria could marry while, at the time, access to the institution of marriage 
was denied to same-sex couples57. The Fifth Section of the Court concluded that there had been no 
violation of Article 14 taken together with Article 8 ECHR (Right to family life) on the grounds that 
‘the applicants, being a different-sex couple to which the institution of marriage is open while being 
excluded from concluding a registered partnership, are not in a relevantly similar or comparable 
situation to same-sex couples who, under the current legislation, have no right to marry and need 
                                                          
55 It should come as no surprise that the traditional view of comparators would be particularly hard to 
reconcile with instances of intersectional discrimination: see, for example, Suzanne B. Goldberg, 
‘Discrimination by Comparison’ (supra), at 764-766. 
56 Application no. 28475/12, Judgment of 26 October 2017. 
57 It is worth noting that the Austrian Constitutional Court subsequently ruled that drawing a distinction 
between registered partnerships and marriage on the basis of sexual orientation was discriminatory against 
same-sex couples and, thus, unconstitutional: see G 258/2017 ua: Unterscheidung zwischen Ehe und 
eingetragener Partnerschaft verletzt Diskriminierungsverbot, Judgment of 4 December 2017. As a result, same-
sex marriage was formally legalised in Austria on the 1st of January 2019. 
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the registered partnership as an alternative means of providing legal recognition to their 
relationship’58.  
In essence, the Court found that different-sex couples could be treated differently to same-sex 
couples (as regards registered partnerships) because same-sex couples could be treated differently 
to different-sex couples (as regards marriage). Since different-sex couples could have their 
relationship recognised through marriage, there was no need for them to have access also to 
registered partnership, such partnerships serving the sole aim of allowing same-sex couples to have 
their relationships recognised. But this reasoning seems to justify the existing segregation as regards 
the means of legal recognition on the grounds that there was such segregation, without providing 
any other objective justification. It is fair to argue then that in that case the Court made full use of 
the cyclical or tautological use of equality in order to avoid touching upon a sensitive issue, that is, 
marriage equality. Indeed, if it held that different-sex couples where similarly situated to same-sex 
couples as regards their need to be free to enter into a registered partnership, then the issue of why 
the exact opposite (i.e. access to marriage by same-sex couples) was not true would become even 
more pertinent; this would be so because the Court would have practically negated, at least as 
concerns different-sex couples, the very segregation that it has itself refused to strike down. 
In fact, the ECtHR has held that Article 14 ECHR cannot be interpreted as conferring a right to same-
sex marriage, which is not provided for by Article 12 ECHR (Right to marry), given that ‘the 
Convention is to be read as a whole and its Articles should therefore be construed in harmony with 
one another’59. However, the Court has also indicated, under the light of current developments in 
national and international law, that Article 12 should no longer be interpreted as being ‘in all 
circumstances […] limited to marriage between persons of the opposite sex [although] as matters 
stand, the question whether or not to allow same-sex marriage is left to regulation by the national 
law of the Contracting State’60. It may fairly be argued then that we are in a transitional period, 
where same-sex marriage gains more and more recognition, the Court recognises this and it might 
eventually intervene, once sufficient consensus has been formed; but in the meantime, it treads 
carefully in what is still considered to be a controversial issue in several Member States. In this 
context, the use of the comparator in the traditional sense of requiring similarity in the factual 
situation between those who were treated differently served its purpose in Ratzenböck, insofar as it 
helped the Court to avoid dealing with a difficult issue in more depth.  
                                                          
58 Ibid., para. 42. 
59 Schalk and Kopf v Austria, Application no. 30141/04, Judgment of 24 June 2010, para. 101. 
60 Ibid., para. 61. 
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Nevertheless, as already indicated, this happened in a way that leaves a lot to be desired in terms of 
logical structure. Once again, the question at hand in Ratzenböck could have been dealt with in a 
more elaborate fashion, respecting the need for ‘likeness’ without allowing the dialectics of 
similarity in the situation to imbue the reasoning and render it a tautology. This could have been 
done by indicating that the legitimate interest of the applicants in accessing registered partnerships 
was not of an ‘equal’ or ‘similar’ weight to the one of same-sex couples as balanced against the 
legitimate aim pursued by the State in introducing registered partnerships; that aim being to provide 
for the legal recognition of same-sex couples whilst reserving the institution of marriage for 
different-sex couples. In his concurring opinion for Ratzenböck, one member of the Court did seem 
to follow this line of thought by extending the reasoning of the majority so as to include an 
examination of relevant State practice, relying upon such practice to conclude ‘that different-sex 
couples are not in a comparable situation to same-sex couples’61. Thus, examined in light of the 
approach suggested here, the conclusion seems to be that the legitimate interest of the applicants 
was not of equal weight to the one of same-sex couples and, thus, the justification inquiry would be 
unnecessary, sufficient justification having already been provided at the stage of comparison. But 
this does not mean that this will always be the case. The way the Court deals with hard cases such as 
this might be particularly useful in helping us provide yet another illustration of how the justification 
stage complements –instead of absorbing or being absorbed by- the comparison stage.  
Indeed, very hard cases might arise where the legitimate interests at hand would be exactly the 
same, in terms of their weight, but the Court might still decide that the treatment at hand is 
objectively justified. A very good example is provided by the case of Khamtokhu and Aksenchik v 
Russia62 which concerned the exemption of women and people aged 65 or over from life 
imprisonment. The Court had no problem establishing comparability as men and people below the 
age of 65, who were not so exempted, were convicted of the same or similar offences63. Even if we 
were to examine the case in terms of whether or not men had a legitimate interest of equal or 
similar weight to the one of women in being exempt from life imprisonment, the result seems to be 
the same. The legitimate aim of ‘promot[ing] the principles of justice and humanity’64, put forward 
by the defending government, does not, on the face of it, seem to weigh more heavily against the 
legitimate interest of men or people below the age of 65 not to be subjected to life imprisonment.  
Comparability in that case then was established in terms of ‘similarity’ in the situations of the groups 
treated differently. By the same token, it seems to be established in terms of similarity in the weight 
                                                          
61 See Ratzenböck and Seydl (supra), concurring opinion of Judge Mits. 
62 Applications nos. 60367/08 and 961/11, Judgment of 24 January 2017. 
63 Ibid., paras. 67-68. 
64 Ibid., para. 70. 
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of legitimate interests of these groups, when balanced against the legitimate aim at hand. 
Nevertheless, the Court did eventually sympathise with the effort of the defending government to 
restrict the number of cases in which life imprisonment could be imposed by exempting certain 
groups with reference to their personal characteristics. According to the Court, this difference in 
treatment was justified on the grounds that it indicated ‘social progress in penological matters’, 
which was ‘not in breach of the applicable international law or markedly at variance with the 
solutions adopted by other member States of the Council of Europe in this sphere’65. What emerges 
once again from cases such as this is that the key difference between the comparability stage, as 
understood here, and the justification stage is that in the latter instance the Court is called upon to 
decide whether or not otherwise similar situations (i.e. individuals recognised as carrying legitimate 
interests of equal weight) can be treated differently on the grounds of a prohibited characteristic, 
with reference to the principle of proportionality and the width of the margin of appreciation. In 
essence, the conclusion of the Russian life imprisonment case was that men, women and people 
below or above 65 were similarly entitled to avoid life imprisonment, in light of the legitimate aim 
(comparability), but the proportionate pursuit of the legitimate aim justified that a distinction could 
be drawn on these prohibited grounds, the margin of appreciation being considered sufficiently wide 
to allow this as the difference in treatment concerned ‘delicate issues’ of penal policy, it aimed to 
promote ‘the interests of the society as a whole’, there was little ‘common ground’ among member 
States and the law was ‘at a transitional stage’ (justification)66.  
By the same token, to bring yet another example, we can look into a case where the Court was faced 
with the application of an Uzbek national who had been married to a Russian national and they had 
a daughter together67. The applicant was denied permission to stay with his family in Russia due to 
the fact that he was HIV-positive. The Court found that he was similarly situated to other people 
with family ties in Russia, who wanted to reside there, for the simple reason that the different 
treatment he received was related to his health status and, thus, but for that status he would have 
been placed in the same position68. This is certainly not an analysis based on similarity in the 
situation as this is traditionally understood by the Court itself and it mostly resembles a direct 
examination of whether or not the treatment was based on a prohibited ground, demonstrating 
once again the volatility and ambiguity in the application of the comparator requirement.  
A more substantive analysis of the comparator requirement would be to say that the legitimate aim 
of protecting public health could not be seen as being jeopardised simply by admitting HIV-positive 
                                                          
65 Ibid. para. 86. It is worth noting that this position was criticised by the dissenting minority. 
66 Ibid., paras. 85 and 87. 
67 See Kiyutin v Russia, Application no. 2700/10, Judgment of 10 March 2011.  
68 Ibid, paras. 59-61. 
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residents into the country and thus, the legitimate aim being neutralised, the legitimate interest of 
the applicant was that of any other person in his position. This was actually acknowledged, but only 
later, in the justification stage69. The true purpose of the justification stage should have been to 
focus solely on whether or not a distinction on the ground of being HIV-positive should have been 
allowed, despite the fact that a proper comparison had been established. The weighting of the 
legitimate interests would have certainly been relevant here as well, but so would other factors, 
such as the ‘widespread stigma and exclusion’ suffered by people living with HIV historically, which 
might serve (as they did, in this case) to narrow the margin of appreciation allowed to the State70. 
For, as already indicated, while establishing comparability as similarity in the weight of legitimate 
interests might often help resolve the justification inquiry, it does not necessarily follow from this 
that comparability is merged with justification. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
The fact that the maxim ‘treat like cases alike’ is often seen as a stand-alone basis for understanding 
formal equality means that justification is in fact engraved into the concept of likeness (or lack 
thereof).  In cases such as the one of Gerger, we have seen how the comparator requirement can be 
used as a way to produce evidence that the treatment at hand is (or is not) based on a prohibited 
ground. Indeed, when two similarly situated individuals are treated differently, the question of why 
this is the case becomes even more pertinent and harder to justify. But to construe the comparator 
requirement simply as a way of examining, albeit superficially, whether or not there has been 
reliance on a prohibited ground is too little to ask from it. By the same token, if we take the 
comparison stage to be sufficient in fully justifying the treatment at hand, due to dissimilarities in 
the factual situation of those compared, as happened in cases such as Van der Mussele or 
Ratzenböck, this is too much to ask from the requirement of likeness; for there is a justification 
element that stretches beyond it and will remain unexamined if we do so. 
This paper has suggested a middle way by construing likeness, and by implication the comparison 
stage, as an element that pertains to the justification inquiry but it is not completely submerged into 
it. It has done so by proposing an understanding of comparability that is based on the weight of the 
legitimate interests involved in demanding a specific treatment. Under this model, when the 
legitimate interest of A (the disadvantaged group) to enjoy a social good outweighs the legitimate 
                                                          
69 To use the exact words, the Court noted, inter alia, that ‘the mere presence of an HIV-positive individual in a 
country is not in itself a threat to public health’ (ibid., para. 68). 
70 Ibid., para. 64. 
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aim of the State in withholding it in a similar or analogous manner as the legitimate interest of B (the 
advantaged group) does, then, comparability is satisfied. This formula is certainly more demanding 
than the one based on mere similarity, but it does seem to be in line with the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR, as this has been reviewed here. Moreover, it is capable of forming part of the justification 
requirement, without completely replacing it, as cases such as the one of Khamtokhu demonstrate. 
Thus, it helps us clarify the confluence between comparisons and justifications in a more sensible 
way. This, in turn, helps us bring closer the notions of formal and substantive equality, allowing for 
the former to accommodate a wider range of discriminatory instances by focusing less on the 
similarity of situations and more on the similarity of the demands. 
Finally, by clarifying the role of comparator in the sense proposed here, the quality of the reasoning 
can certainly be improved. For while a model based on the equal weight of the legitimate interests 
at hand might be more complicated than the one that revolves around the question of similarity in 
situations, it is also far less ambiguous. This becomes even clearer if we consider that the closest the 
Strasbourg Court has come to creating a formula for assessing the comparator requirement, as 
currently espoused, is to ask whether or not ‘the persons subjected to different treatment are in a 
relevantly similar situation, taking into account the elements that characterise their circumstances in 
the particular context’71; the comparability of such elements being examined ‘in the light of the 
subject-matter and purpose of the measure which makes the distinction in question’72. The time has 
come for a more elaborate approach, one that will interpret likeness in a more sensible and precise 
manner, allowing for a more appropriate consideration of the issues, a better quality of reasoning 
and, of course, the delivery of a fairer, better informed, judgment as a matter of outcome. This 
paper has aimed to propose such a different approach, in a manner that also helps us make more 






                                                          
71 See Fábián v Hungary, Application no. 78117/13, Judgment of 5 September 2017, para. 121. 
72 Ibid. 
